Rio+20: Third PrepCom and the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD)

Mountains ITEREI Montanhas Flora

13-22 June 2012 | Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

http://www.iisd.ca/uncsd/rio20/enb/

On 22 June 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD, or Rio+20) adopted the outcome document titled “The Future We Want,” and, following statements by governments, UN officials and Brazilian President Rousseff, the meeting closed at 8:41 pm. The final day of the three-day event opened with statements by 8 Heads of State and Government and 45 Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and heads of delegation. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was among the speakers, and announced a partnership between the US and African nations, with US$20 million in funding, to unlock private financing for clean energy projects in Africa and beyond. In her closing statement, Brazilian President Rousseff pledged US$6 million to UNEP’s fund targeting developing countries, and will direct US$10 million towards climate change challenges in Africa, least developed countries, and SIDS. A similar pledge had been offered earlier in the meeting by Wen Jiabao, Premier of China, and total pledges of US$513 billion in funding were reported to have been committed by governments, the private sector, civil society and other groups in response to a call for voluntary commitments to achieve the Conference’s goals. In closing the Conference, Rousseff stressed that Rio+20 was the most participatory conference in history and was a “global expression of democracy.” She also said that Rio+20 has demonstrated multilateralism is a legitimate pathway to build solutions for global problems. In all, 12,000 individuals were reported to have registered to attend the official Rio+20 event and its 500 official side events, and another 30,000 participated in one or more of the up to 3000 unofficial parallel events that took place throughout Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

The  Earth Negotiations Bulletin Summary of this Conference is now available in PDF format at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2751e.pdf and in HTML format at http://www.iisd.ca/vol27/enb2751e.html

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE UNCSD

“Don’t hesitate to go too far, the truth lies beyond it.” (Nadine Gordimer, Nobel Prize for Literature)

One of the harshest critics of the political outcome from the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) was the legacy of the “Spirit of Rio” itself. That spirit walked the corridors of RioCentro in the form of The Elders of the process and members of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Global Sustainability who—like prophets of old standing at the threshold between the old world and the new—issued profound calls for a “great transformation” and a “new narrative” for the age of the Anthropocene. The Secretary-General’s High Level Panel declared: “In this epoch, there is an unacceptable risk that human pressures on the planet, should they continue on a business as usual trajectory, will trigger abrupt and irreversible changes with catastrophic outcomes for human societies and life as we know it.” Together with the Major Groups and the multitudes who gathered to create a festival of initiatives in Rio, their elevated appeal to a sense of urgency, moral purpose and a science-led debate served only to underline the vast distance that has opened up between the practices of sustainable development on the ground and the ability of multilateral negotiations to set the pace.

So how will the outcome of the UNCSD be assessed when the dust settles? There has been no shortage of instant critiques of the negotiated text, titled “The Future We Want.” But just as early downbeat assessments of the 1992 Earth Summit gave way to a recognition that the world’s leaders had, in fact, caught the zeitgeist and shifted the language of development for good, will the understated recommendations in the Rio+20 document provide sufficient clarity and direction for an effective, science-led agenda for sustainable development?  Of particular importance will be the period between now and 2013, when, inter alia, the final review will take place of the Millennium Development Goals and a transition must be lined up for the launch of universal Sustainable Development Goals. It is in this light that this analysis examines the following questions: what were the key outcomes from Rio+20; why did Brazil force an early consensus in Rio and what factors influenced their approach to the Conference Presidency; and what are the prospects for a science-led era of leadership and governance in the age of the Anthropocene?

KEY OUTCOMES: IF NOT NOW, WHEN? IF NOT HERE, WHERE?

For an appreciation of the constraints that framed the treatment of the major themes of the UNCSD, it is worth recalling the wider geopolitical and economic environments that shaped this event. This Summit took place as the US presidential electoral cycle entered its final months and in the midst of an unprecedented crisis in the Euro zone. The negotiations also had to compete with other political developments, forcing some prominent world leaders to stay away.

These constraints in the wider political environment led to a series of outcomes in the negotiated text that, in effect, “kicked the can down the road” when it came to detailed decision-making. For example, in the Means of Implementation negotiations, the US was one of the delegations that put down an early marker, indicating that there would be no new money on the table.

A long-drawn out series of preparatory negotiations served only to further undermine confidence in the multilateral system’s ability to deal with sustainable development. Less than half the draft text had been agreed by the time delegations arrived in their rooms in Rio de Janeiro and media speculation about the prospects for the Conference had hit the floor.

Under these circumstances, the Brazilian hosts opted to embark on a carefully calibrated iteration of delegations’ positions, based on an intensive listening exercise. They insisted that an effective approach to “red lines” was to identify only those issues that amounted to “violations of representation,” in other words, those issues that capitals could not accept in the text. Delegations were invited to acknowledge that their aspirations— regardless of how strongly they felt—could not effectively be regarded as red line issues, given the collective nature of negotiations and the inevitability of having to accept wins and losses, or a fair distribution of discomfort. This approach meant that Brazil’s compilation texts were designed for an optimal rather than an ideal set of outcomes.

Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD): There are two principal outcomes under the heading of IFSD: a decision to establish a universal intergovernmental high-level political forum to eventually replace the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD); and the strengthening of UNEP.

From the outset, the mandate and functioning of the CSD have been the subject of contention as the UN has come to learn some harsh lessons over the past twenty years as the organization has attempted to reflect the conceptual requirement of integrating the three pillars of sustainable development in its institutional design. The bureaucratic tendency to respond to such demands through a proliferation of mandates and incremental institutional reform rarely delivers the goods and, indeed, may set the very objective back by setting up and exacerbating existing intra-institutional competition for resources. This explains the repeated references over the past twenty years of intergovernmental decisions to system coherence and the need to address over-lapping mandates. Even as the Rio+20 negotiations on issues such as UNEP were on-going, some recommendations sparked a flurry of faxes and memos across parts of the UN system with deep interests in the patchwork of mandates related to sustainable development.

Negotiations on the high-level political forum focused on functions rather than a well-defined outcome. Its chief function will be to provide political leadership, guidance and recommendations for sustainable development. The final format will be determined by an “intergovernmental, transparent and inclusive negotiation process” under the UNGA, with a view to convening the first session at the beginning of the 68th session. The prospects for the successful implementation of this decision will rely on the UN’s leadership capacity to turn the language of the negotiated text on an “action oriented agenda” and the avoidance of “overlap” into reality. Some are looking, in particular, to the UN Secretary-General to champion a break from established patterns in the negotiation of sustainable development that have too often resulted in outputs that have been emasculated in the intergovernmental process, and end up gathering dust on book shelves.

One example of an issue where further discussion is likely to be aired at the 67th session of the General Assembly is the persistent question of “strengthening and upgrading” UNEP. The outcome document agreed on universal membership of the Governing Council and improved funding. However, the European Union and a number of African countries continue to hold on to their aspiration to see UNEP transformed into a United Nations Environment Organization (UNEO)—with the status of a specialized agency—in the belief that this would empower the standing of the environment pillar alongside the social and economic dimensions. Right up to the closing plenary on Friday, there were suggestions that one or two delegations might attempt to re-open the negotiated text in an attempt to reintroduce their demand for a UNEO, in defiance of a US warning that they would re-open some of the other most difficult elements in the text should the UNEO issue come back onto the table. The US does not share the European enthusiasm for a revised UNEP mandate, as they tend to see UNEP’s existing policy role as rather generous as it stands. So the Europeans and other advocates of a transformed UNEP have a job on their hands to convince others of the merits of a transformed UNEP.

Means of Implementation (MOI): As the PrepCom began, key arguments and concerns on the traditional battleground of finance and technology transfer were well rehearsed and entrenched. MOI debates around finance go to the heart of the global deal that, supposedly, underwrote the decisions of the first Rio Conference. At one point, in what turned out to be a short-lived gesture, the G-77/China walked out of a negotiating session on the green economy to underline their concerns about a lack of movement on MOI. Proposals for financial contributions—running into hundreds of billions of dollars up to and beyond 2018—were taken off the table after the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and others insisted that Rio+20 was not a “pledging conference.” In a trend that was evident in pledges announced outside the negotiations, the text also recognizes additional resources for implementation provided on a South-South basis.

The G-77/China called on developed countries to commit to providing new and additional resources, new flexibilities in the intellectual property rights regime, and the establishment of an international mechanism to facilitate technology transfer under UNGA. Delegations fell back on JPOI language after failure to move forward on technology transfer issues such as intellectual property rights and the TRIPS agreement. The final text includes an agreement to start an intergovernmental process under the UNGA to propose options on an effective sustainable development financing strategy, and requests relevant UN agencies to identify options for a facilitation mechanism that promotes the development, transfer and dissemination of clean and environmentally sound technologies. On trade, the “red line” issues of liberalization of trade in environmental goods and services and on committing to take actions on market distorting subsidies were not identified in separate paragraphs but were noted as “important issues” that need to be addressed. Most of the language on trade was deleted in a “nuclear option” proposed by the PrepCom facilitator, which cleared out contentious language and relocated a paragraph on subsidies to the subsection on sustainable consumption and production. The only two paragraphs retained were “straight forward” to underscore the importance of a rules-based, open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system and to redouble efforts on the Doha Development Agenda.

Green Economy: Flagged as one of the key themes of the UNCSD, and championed by UNEP, the green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication met with fierce resistance from the G-77/China. Bolivia summed up the opposition, asserting that no single development model—whatever its color—should be imposed, and that the rights of developing states to pursue their own development paths must be upheld. Observers were quick to note, however, that Heads of State and ministers from a number of G-77/China countries addressing the plenary were clearly not “on message” as they made repeated references to the “green economy.”

The position of the G-77/China led to the creation of a very defensive and highly qualified text in this section of the document, with the EU and others enjoying only a partial success in putting forward the case for the green economy. Nevertheless, UNEP concluded after the Conference that the agenda is still largely on track.

A far-reaching and related achievement is recognition of the need for broader measures of progress to complement GDP in order to better inform policy decisions. This serves as a slight corrective for the repeated references to economic growth throughout the negotiated text, where new indicators would begin to measure the environmental and social costs of material well-being and shore up emerging ideas about living well and alternative models of prosperity. In related developments, the text also adopts the 10-Year Framework of Programmes (10YFP) on sustainable consumption and production, which was first called for in the JPOI, and corporate sustainability reporting.

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): Agreement on a process to develop universal SDGs was one of the most important political decisions of the Conference, given its centrality in helping to define the post-2015 development agenda. Based on a Brazilian compromise text, the document attempts to placate both the EU’s concerns that the process is science-led, while protecting the G-77/China’s concerns about the rights of government experts to participate in the elaboration of the SDGs. The EU lost out in its demand that the Conference decision go beyond process issues, given G-77/China’s resistance to calling for a more detailed consideration of the themes and timelines for the SDGs.

On the prospects for the SDGs, those close to the process see a narrow window of time in which to ensure the smooth passage of short, meaningful and inspiring goals that can capture the public imagination. Some indicated that the hope is that a smooth “passing of the baton” can be lined up by a Special Session of the General Assembly in September 2013, with a transition from the final review of the MDGs to adoption of SDGs. However, it will not be easy to craft language that is both universal and capable of transcending the extreme sensitivities of countries and regions at very different points on the development spectrum: ranging all the way from the Bolivarian states asserting a radically plural post-colonial discourse of multiple development models through to what is regarded as a monocultural alternative that originates in the capitals of leading developed countries, who stand accused of making the world safe for Hollywood and the unsustainable consumption of celebrity lifestyles.

At the heart of the dispute over the SDGs is an issue that became much more explicit during the Rio+20 negotiations: the quality of debate and the extent to which the output is informed by scientific findings. The SDG process will be one to watch to gauge the success of advocates, including the Rio Elders and the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Global Sustainability, who have concluded that an enhanced science-policy interface is required as part of the solution to improving the quality of multilateral negotiations and their outcomes.

Oceans: Discussions on a key oceans paragraph—marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction—were particularly representative of conflict over Rio+20’s role, given that most thematic issues are being discussed in other international fora. Just one month before Rio+20, many of the same delegates in the consultation group had met in New York for the fifth meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction (BBNJ), and had discussed the same questions. Yet, delegates reported that it had been beneficial to have the conversations in Rio. The outcome, however, was not the strong message that many were looking for, setting a two-year timeline for taking a decision on the development of an international instrument under UNCLOS on BBNJ. Despite this disappointment, a number of NGOs welcomed the other paragraphs on fisheries and food security as very positive.

Voluntary Commitments: Rio+20 was much more than its negotiated outcome. The Conference organizers, and indeed, the outcome document itself, acknowledge that governments cannot deliver sustainable development alone. At RioCentro and throughout Rio during the week, a festival of sustainable development-related activities took place, involving tens of thousands of participants. Many of the world’s leading proponents of sustainability spent most if not all of their time addressing important “side events.” Voluntary agreements were entered into by governments, NGOs, and major groups, including 500 companies and universities. Governments are involved in 50 of the 692 commitments, accounting for only 7%.

However, lingering questions remain: to what extent are these commitments additional, have resources been committed, and will they be monitored and evaluated? These seem to be left to civil society to sort out in order to hold government, industry and other organizations accountable. But the overarching question is the extent to which this bottom-up approach can contribute to actions needed to address the sustainability crises identified by the scientific community.

MULTILATERALISM: BRAZIL – THE LAND OF OLYMPIAN DIPLOMATS

Participants in the UNCSD negotiations and summit watchers were treated to a highly unusual moment in the history of multilateral environmental negotiations on sustainable development. By successfully facilitating—perhaps forcing—a consensus early in the process, the Brazilians preserved the quality and integrity of the main outcome, “The Future We Want.” In doing so they also preserved the legacy of the original Rio “Earth Summit,” which is closely identified with the city, thus saving two summits.

The host country’s decision to intervene prior to the Conference and launch the pre-conference informal consultations was, undoubtedly, driven in part by the fact that they shared a widely held view that a prolongation of intense negotiations was unlikely to result in an improved document. Their confident leadership style drew negative comparisons with the lackluster management of the preparatory process as a whole. Had the Conference negotiations been allowed to proceed in the traditional manner to the bitter end—with the media reporting stand-offs, late nights and rumors of collapse (a real risk here)—the Brazilian hosts would have received much of the blame. By taking some of the media attention off the negotiating text and allowing a greater focus to fall on the much more positive news generated by a festival of side events throughout Rio, the host country calculated that the negotiating text would also emerge in a much better light. By salvaging perceptions of the process, the host country may, at least, have encouraged observers to take a closer look at the negotiated text and appreciate that a sound judgment should be held off until future decisions are formed and taken at the level of the UNGA, for example. As one delegate commented: “No summit can be reduced to a text!”

So the host country set out to make sure that the Rio+20 process could “bring back a certain rationality to the negotiations.” They had noted the lessons from recent climate negotiations where late night stand-offs and subsequent poor decisions have been followed by months of interpretation, re-interpretation and, occasionally, breakdowns in consensus. The host country had been deeply concerned by the resulting loss of confidence in the ability of the multilateral process to deal effectively with sustainable development issues. They were motivated by a desire not only to preserve the legacy of Rio, but to preserve the reputation of multilateralism itself. For Brazil and others, multilateralism provides an important purchase on shaping the international environment. They sought to bring back this dimension of how well the intergovernmental negotiating process can work if delegations can agree on things without the unnecessary brinkmanship, exhausting late nights and confusion. Secondly, they did everything in their power to preserve the unity of purpose within the G-77/China in order to simplify the consultation process on the preparation of the negotiating text during pre-conference informal discussions. And finally, they made a series of judgment calls on the text, based on a careful assessment of how the world has changed in the twenty years since the first Rio “Earth Summit,” and this enabled them to reach a series of understandings—sometimes uncomfortable—with the delegations. Brazil’s confident and high stakes approach to the Rio+20 negotiations exemplified its status as an emerging broker and guardian of the multilateral system, thus ensuring that they repeated their 1992 achievement in bringing the UNCSD to a successful conclusion.

LESSONS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE

As the Nobel Laureates, scientific leaders and others reminded those in RioCentro, this is the era where humankind has become the dominant driver of geological change on earth, forcing a recognition that all activity must now be judged against its contribution to the creation of a civilization that can flourish within the “safe operating space for humanity” defined by social and ecological boundaries. This will be an era that some believe demands nothing less than a “great transformation” or new narrative with an unprecedented turn in our approaches to all three dimensions of sustainable development—viewed not in isolation but as a “triple helix.”

For the science community, Rio hosted some important events, among them the launch of the “Future Earth” initiative, a research-based collaboration between several UN agencies and others, and a dialogue between Nobel laureates and young people. The formal opening of the conference with ministers featured a video prepared by “Planet Under Pressure,” and the outcome document itself includes a call to strengthen the science-policy interface.

We are experiencing a foretaste of a not-so-distant future in which ecological stresses will feed into profound challenges for our political institutions. Paradoxically, at this moment of transition, these institutions have also been exposed, in the course of the past twenty years, as largely unfit for purpose. In the context of sustainable development and climate politics, these institutions have suffered a popular loss of confidence that in itself is a source of risk. Too often, there is a perception that science gets left at the door.

All of this helps to explain, to some extent, the strange disconnect between the assessments of Rio+20 by civil society and many of the government delegates. There is a deep interest in preserving the integrity of multilateralism on the part of governments. But there is awareness too, that these same international institutions have been damaged by their failure to produce solutions that rise to the moment, effectively integrate the latest scientific evidence, and address the world as it is and not as it once was. In their Declaration on the eve of the Conference, “The Future We Choose,” The Elders, Nobel laureates and members of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel made some important observations about the need for a fully integrated science-based approach built on partnerships between the public and private sectors, and with civil society. During a workshop to put the final touches on their Declaration, several talked about a new contract between science and society on the issues of sustainable development. The Declaration states: “Such an integrated model which reflects the scientific consensus and is guided by the principles of responsibility and equity will and must provide a systemic solution that ensures the wise stewardship of the planet and its people.”

The popular perception among observers of multilateral negotiations that the most up-to-date science on the three pillars of sustainable development is seldom reflected when government delegations have gathered on occasions such as the UNCSD is becoming an explicit issue that will make or break confidence in the multilateral system’s approach to the environment and development. For how long, for example, can the science-based concept of “planetary boundaries” be ruled out of the discussion, as they were during discussions at Rio+20, in the face of calls for their inclusion from Major Groups, including Youth and Children. Discussions on the green economy were also a pale reflection of current global research on a new political economy of sustainable development that would place new economics at the heart of macroeconomic decision making at this time when fresh thinking is required to respond to the systemic crises around traditional models of growth.

THE FUTURE WE HAVE NOT YET IMAGINED

In a final statement to a meeting of Major Groups at Rio+20, the Children and Youth caucus presented their judgment on the deliberations that failed to inspire them. They told the government delegations: “We came here to celebrate our generation. We have danced, dreamed and loved on the streets of Rio and found something to believe in. You have chosen not to celebrate with us.” It was a feature of Rio+20 that this youthful, radical and always hopeful challenge coincided in many ways with insights of The Elders of the Rio process.

One common theme across delegations and civil society has been a realization that governments cannot deliver sustainable development alone. The negotiating text recognizes the role of a wider global movement for sustainability. Unlike World Cup football there are no spectators in the game of sustainable development. To paraphrase the popular Mayan saying: “We are not simply the generation that we have been waiting for; we are the leaders we have been waiting for.”

Critical assessments of the multilateral process are useful but only insofar as they serve both to inform the legitimate aspiration to hold governments to account and identify responsibilities for the multitudes to translate even these limited ambitions into “The Future We Want,” while holding open the infinitely demanding proposition that the truth is also about a common future that we have not yet imagined.

This analysis has been excerpted  from the UNCSD summary issue of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin © <enb@iisd.org> http://www.iisd.ca/vol27/enb2751e.html , which was written and edited by Peter Doran, Ph.D., Delia Paul, Keith Ripley, Nathalie Risse, Ph.D., James Van Alstine, Ph.D, and Lynn Wagner, Ph.D. The Digital Editor is Leila Mead. The Editor is Pamela S. Chasek, Ph.D. <pam@iisd.org>. The Director of IISD Reporting Services is Langston James “Kimo” Goree VI <kimo@iisd.org>. The Sustaining Donors of the Bulletin are the European Commission (DG-ENV), the Government of the United States of America (through the Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs), the Government of Canada (through CIDA), the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), and the Government of Australia. General Support for the Bulletin during 2012 is provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Environment of Sweden, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, SWAN International, the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN), the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Ministry of Environment (through the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies – IGES), the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (through the Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute – GISPRI), and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Funding for translation of the Bulletin into French has been provided by the Government of France, the Belgium Walloon Region, the Province of Québec, and the International Organization of the Francophone (OIF and IEPF). The opinions expressed in the Bulletin are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IISD or other donors. Excerpts from the Bulletin may be used in non-commercial publications with appropriate academic citation. For information on the Bulletin, including requests to provide reporting services, contact the Director of IISD Reporting Services at <kimo@iisd.org>,  +1-646-536-7556 or 300 East 56th St., 11D, New York, NY 10022, USA.

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Langston James “Kimo” Goree VI
Vice President, Reporting Services and United Nations Liaison
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) — United Nations Office
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